Hi everyone,
After a fruitful meeting in the afterhours yesterday with the GrantsDAO, it became apparent that the Community subDAO and GrantsDAO seem to pursue very similar goals in the ecosystem, and that perhaps it might be worth discussing moving the two closer together to streamline the operational overhead for everyone involved, as well as give the mStable Community a bigger say in the decision making process of funding certain activities, and overall governance.
Our initial reasoning behind this in the call resulted from the Community Blog either being hosted by the GrantsDAO or the Community subDAO (Penguin managed this previously), and it wasn’t quite clear which the better option would be, as both carry an important voice in the ecosystem.
Thinking more around this, we started questioning why to even have these two entities be separate, as we regularly did approach the GrantsDAO for funding community-related ventures either way (Designs, Events, Compensations regarding work community members have performed etc…).
It is in this spirit that I would like to propose to merge the 2 entities into one future mStable CommunityDAO, living right next to the ProtocolDAO and the TreasuryDAO, with the same importance and independent status given as these two.
For one, I would ask @stonp89 to present his findings on the last couple of quarters of funding given towards the GrantsDAO as per this proposal as well as ask @soulsby on the operational workload assigned to him for managing the Community subDAO from this proposal and then evaluate the feasibility of stonp becoming the official Cat Herder for this proposed CommunityDAO, merge the signers into this new DAO, remove core contributors that already hold a position in any of the other two DAOs to ensure neutrality on the signing and voting process and consolidate the funding requests from both into one neat quarterly request moving forward.
I’d also like to ask @stonp89 to think about this and propose staffing requirements to effectively meet and tackle the resulting workloads (we’ve been understaffed in the GrantsDAO since inception) in an economic way that doesn’t overtax the quarterly funding. Initially we found that one part time core community member together with @Fungus might be able to match the resulting increased workloads, but keen to hear more feedback and opinions on it.
Regarding the funding, I’d propose to increase the funding to match the requirements of the GrantsDAO and Community subDAO moving forward, based on the findings from @stonp89 and consider grant the multisig the liberty to proportionally liquidate received MTA in order to ensure runway requirements can be met in due time between each funding round.
Lastly, I’d also propose that a certain amount of leftover MTA be used to getting the CommunityDAO more involved in governance, and have them stake in our protocol to receive increasing governance rights over the ecosystem, especially considering that the Community voice is very fragmented in individual decisions, and getting a focused lens on proposals via a shared stash of power governed by community members alone seem like a sensible option to receive neutral stewardship from this part of the ecosystem over time. All inflationary rewards are to be compounded by the DAO at a regular interval.
For the first year, I’d propose to initially allow the CommunityDAO to stake up to 75% of the leftover MTA of each cycle, and then evaluate this number at the end of the year and see if it negatively impacts the operational performance of the DAO (hoarding).
This will effectively utilize unused funding that the ecosystem was happy with giving away either way, and at the same time build a solid voice for the mStable Core Community in governance, even without any individuals that are interested in participating hodling a meaningful stake themselves.
Very keen to hear what everyone thinks about this, and if it seems like a sensible first step in our quest to merge Community with Governance.
Personally, I believe strongly this will become a de facto standard in the business, and avoid governance fiascos like the ones even big blue chip protocols experienced, and ensure stewardship of mStable is moved towards decentralization where each part of the system is equally important.