✅ [RFC] Disable all dials except staking & treasury and create a v2-incentives one

First of all, let me introduce myself. I’m Julian, I’ve been part of the core development team for the past two months working as data scientist. My main focus has been v2, which is why I haven’t posted much in the forum yet, but tokenomics is another area that should be a top priority for all MTA holders which is why I bring this proposal:


This RFC would like to gather feedback regarding a proposal to restructure the MTA emissions in order to improve the economics of the token and shift focus from v1 to v2.

The key actions prosed include:

  • Disable all dials except for staking & treasury.
  • Create a v2 incentives dial


As the price of MTA drops and in the middle of the bear market, we need to be more responsible on the use of our capital. While we are committed to further decentralising mStable, the market has shown that distributing it to the vaults is not the right way to do it, as liquidity providers are just looking for a higher yield and will proceed to dump the token as soon as they get it. Additionally, we are focusing most of our development efforts on building v2, but still using our capital to incentivise v1.


DeFi Summer kicked out in Summer 2020 when Compound announced the first liquidity mining program, giving out $COMP as incentives to provide liquidity in their protocol. Since then, many DeFi protocols replicated. That led to many tokens prices falling considerably (despite an initial pump) as liquidity providers (or “farmers”) would sell their rewards until the price of said token was low enough and then moved to find the next more profitable opportunity.

This was proven by Nansen and Bancor and Topaze Blue, that claimed that “42% of yield farmers that enter a farm on the day it launches exit within 24 hours”, and that “70% of all the LP positions last less than a month”, respectively:

Many protocols are realising it and thus are moving in the same direction, which is evidenced by the 85% reduction in bribes (from all time high) in Votium:

In the particular case of mStable, it is not being effective, even with a 12% subsidised APY, which is failing to grow (or maintain) the deposits in imBTC:

DeFi 2.0 tried to solve this problem using Protocol-Owned Liquidity. While this seemed to work in the beginning, in reality it just served to hide and delay the problem: if you issue a token and fail to introduce a demand by accruing value to this token, the price of the asset will fall. And that’s what has been happening

We are committed to further decentralise mStable, but we don’t think that giving away MTA holders equity to rent seekers is just doing it. The market is signalling that it rewards protocols with a more responsible use of their capital, and we are incentivising a 12% APY in a USD 1M worth of BTC vault.

At the same time, we want to reward stakers that actually believe in the long term of mStable, given their exposure to MTA, as we believe that this is indeed the right way to ensure the decentralisation of mStable. As it is shown in the chart below, showing total MTA staked in 2022, stakers (mostly) don’t sell either their principal nor their gains:

This proposal is moving in the same direction as the actions we have been taking in the past few months to protect the token price: repurposing liquidity and disabling uneconomical dials. While this proposal will not entirely fix the tokenomics and pump instantly the price of MTA, it will contribute to having a more sustainable supply.

Finally, we want to state that our focus is on v2. We are unstoppably building a new set of yield bearing products that will shift the current situation in which the earnings of the protocol is accruing to users, to a one that not just accrues to the users but also to MTA stakers and holders. This will improve the tokenomics considerably. However, while we are focusing in building v2, we are still financially incentivising our old products. This is inconsistent and should be improved.

Therefore, I propose to:

  • Disable all vaults and feeder pools dials, leaving only the staking and treasury dials. The treasury dial signals a long term support on the protocol vs giving inflationary rewards to stakers. The utilisation of these funds will be for discretion of the Treasury DAO (and thus, MTA holders), but potential uses include: raising capital in the future, compensating team/community members, providing liquidity, additional V2 emissions, extending emissions beyond the end of 2027.
  • Create a v2 incentives dial, to accumulate MTA that will be used to bootstrap the v2 Metavaults when they are launched. The details of the distribution of these MTA will be further discussed and voted on separate TTP, but potential uses included: retroactive drop for early Meta Vault investors, a live liquidity mining program, etc.


The proposed rule is to:

  • Disable the following dials:
    • imUSD, imBTC, GUSD fPool, BUSD fPool, RAI fPool, alUSD fPool, FEI fPool, hBTC fPool, tBTC fPool (v2), imUSD fPool, FRAX fPool, MTA BPT, Votium Bribe, Visor, Vesper & Idle Finance
  • Create a v2 incentive dial


  • It will improve the price action of MTA
  • We will be more capital efficient ahead of a bear market
  • We will be more consistent with balancing our focus between v1 and v2


  • Might lose some liquidity

Next Steps

It is suggested that the community comment on this RFC in the coming days, and bearing no significant opposition or change in ideation, we would move ahead with this RFC in the coming week and create a formal draft proposal on Github to be used for review. Meta Governors are encouraged to provide as much feedback as possible until then, so we can create the best possible outcome for mStable and its users.


Hi Julian, thanks for this insightful post. I am concerned about the potential flight in liquidity if we were to stop all emissions to other dials. Are we able to, potentially model the range of outcomes?

If not, I suggest we test how much deposit we lose for each 10% reduction in emissions and decide if we should do a gradual or immediate halt; thereafter rather than a sudden and complete stop of emissions.

Hi Derc, thanks for your reply.

First of all, the liquidity is not 100% coming from the emissions (at least not in all cases). As it can be seen in the imBTC chart showed in the post, we are offering up to a 12% APY in BTC (I’m not sure if there are higher APYs for BTC in the market, at least not with such a low risk with imBTC) but are still failing to retain our TVL.

On the second place, even if we assume that we are going to suffer a flight of liquidity (at least for the feeder pools), I think that it would still makes sense: as it can be seen in this Dune Dashboard, the revenue we are making from the feeder pools is far less than what we are giving up in emissions. There are a lot of more efficient ways to use MTA holders capital than subsidising rates.

Finally, regarding your suggestion, I don’t think it’s possible to reduce 10% the emissions. We’d need to convince MTA stakers to vote 10% less of what they are currently voting and allocate that to the treasury. What we actually could do is roll out in stages: first disable some dials (maybe GUSD, imBTC, BUSD, FRAX & RAI) and then the rest. I’m still convinced in disabling them all at once: as long as there’s one enabled, stakers that are looking to profit off of MTA emissions are likely to switch their vote to that dial and direct their liquidity to that vault.


I’m in favour of this proposal. MTA emissions have shown to be highly inefficient in terms of incentives <> revenue. The only group benefiting from this are farmers who are constantly selling MTA for the stables/BTC.

I did some small analysis and this is a table showing emissions vs protocol revenue(I’m cutting the protocol revenue in half already because we use that to do buy-back for stakers).

month MTA Emitted MTA Emitted (USD) mStable Revenue
2022-01 652,333.99 489,921.45 24,056.00
2022-02 644,093.94 427,754.05 11,308.20
2022-03 788,192.37 347,768.42 8,921.12
2022-04 620,520.31 246,128.66 9,715.75
2022-05 610,805.94 129,892.12 11,295.33
2022-06 603,782.47 108,480.60 13,447.25

Those numbers don’t look great, and we should do something about it.

You mentioned in your proposal to disable a whole lot of dials.

  • alUSD, FEI, HBTC, tBTCv2 and Visor have been already disabled following MCCP 22.

I would be keen to continue this path and disable more dials that are performing the worse. For that, it would be helpful to see how much MTA is spend per dial and how much contribution TVL/Revenue does it contribute per MTA.

Then we can make a plan to disable the next batch of dials:

  • Third-party dials (less incentives to protocol outside mStable)
  • Dials that perform the worse

I would also suggest keeping at least some dials, like imUSD, because this still contributes to the majority of our TVL and Revenue.

If we remove everything except for Treasury and Staking then we might as well completely remove the Emissions Controller, because what’s the point of having an Emissions Controller in that case?

For the “Create a v2 incentive dial” we need to further specify how this will be used in the future. Otherwise it sounds to me like a Treasury dial with different name.

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Thanks a lot @jkusne for this deep analysis?
I strongly agree that the ($ earned ratio / MTA spent) ratio is insanely low, making no economic sense to spend useful liquidity.
For feeder pools, it’s quite straightforward to make a decision on these dials using @rugolini data
However, I join @dimsome and @derc in their analysis: we might need to keep 1-2 dials that are essential to the sucess/attractivity of our current product line (mainly Save). Also, any competitiveness on our Save rate relies on external liquidity.
I’m thinking here of:

  • Keeping the imUSD dial
  • Keeping the Votium - Curve mUSD/3CRV dial pool responsible for 1/3 of our TVL
    I wonder in this case, which dial is the more effective to attract TVL (MTA spent / revenue earned)

These “legacy dials” are obviously a temporary/transitional solution I envision while we ship the next product line. In the long run, this could/should definitely evolve.

@dimsome I didn’t add any data related to the feeder pools because they wouldn’t change anything in the report

Data Source

Thanks @naddison :clap:


Emissions of MTA per week

Emissions of MTA per week in USD

Governance Fees in USD

This is the total fee without splitting it with stakers

Revenue per month

month mBTC Governance Fees mUSD Governance Fees mUSD Governance Fees(Polygon) mStable_rev
0 2022-01 272.769 37472.8 10366.4 24056
1 2022-02 89.4694 17789.3 4737.65 11308.2
2 2022-03 58.4934 13590.9 4192.81 8921.12
3 2022-04 64.1489 16123.8 3243.58 9715.75
4 2022-05 120.467 19846.3 2623.93 11295.3
5 2022-06 140.592 25732.9 1021.03 13447.3

mStable_rev is the sum divided by 2

MTA Emitted + mStable Revenue

month mta_emitted mta_usd mBTC Governance Fees mUSD Governance Fees mUSD Governance Fees(Polygon) mStable_rev
0 2022-01 652334 489921 272.769 37472.8 10366.4 24056
1 2022-02 644094 427754 89.4694 17789.3 4737.65 11308.2
2 2022-03 788192 347768 58.4934 13590.9 4192.81 8921.12
3 2022-04 620520 246129 64.1489 16123.8 3243.58 9715.75
4 2022-05 610806 129892 120.467 19846.3 2623.93 11295.3
5 2022-06 603782 108481 140.592 25732.9 1021.03 13447.3
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Hmm. A lot to unpack in this thread.

Dials: I’m inherently okay with closing any dials that public governance wants to close. If too many dials are closed because governors didn’t show up to vote, all I can do is shrug and say “make a proposal to re-enable the dial you’re passionate about.”

On the other hand, disabling dials that aren’t issues from a dust/distribution perspective seems bait-and-switch-y to me. Unless I missed it, nothing in the discussion around the gauge controller initially said anything to the effect of “if your gauge distributes more MTA than it earns in fees, it’s subject to disablement.”

This is why I’d rather just reduce overall emissions. Most voters seem to think that reducing emissions is always good anyway so I don’t think it would be an impossible proposal to get through. (The truth is more complicated though.)

Tokenomics: As said, I can appreciate the focus on not wasting token distribution. While that might be a useful stop-gap, the real issue is that MTA doesn’t accrue direct value (and I mean direct, as in “value is paid out in hard currency”) to holders. The market has priced the governance rights of our protocol.

I want to push back on a couple of things in @jkusne 's opening post:

Votium: Two things have been conflated to arrive at the wrong conclusion here. The expense of bribing, even now, is still more efficient than direct liquidity rewards. The data is right above the section in the screenshot that was cut off:

$1.70 > $1.00

The reason that bribes have quantitatively dropped is because tons of protocols don’t have the treasury funds left to bribe. Their token values fell to the floor, just like ours did.

The protocols that remain in the bear market bribing game are well-connected primitives or second-layer protocols. And whatever you want to call mim. :face_with_hand_over_mouth: The market believes in those protocols far more than it believes in ours, and they have more income to throw around. So they can afford to play the game.

Defi 2.0: I disagree pretty strongly with this analysis, honestly. PoL worked (and is working) just fine. But it’s a specific tool. Bonding via Dutch auction is an extremely effective and efficient pricing mechanism for distributing your token. Protocols owning their own liquidity (becoming buyers of last resort and enabling direct market actions) is very powerful. PoL isn’t a panacea for getting people to buy your token, and on that count I think the analysis is correct. Throwing out the tool due to misunderstanding though is…not good.

@Jeshli will probably have more to say on Votium and bribing in general when he sees this thread and put it better than I can.

Overall, I appreciate where this is coming from. I disagree with portions of the core analysis though.

I think @dimsome brings up some important points as well. imUSD in particular seems like a dangerous dial to attempt to disable.

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Thanks @dimsome @TClochard & @trustindistrust for your comments. I’m gonna attempt to summarise your concerns and respond to some of them. But first, I would like to state that the role of MTA emissions is to grow mStable business, and ultimately, make more money than what we are spending. The return on investment of emissions in the past 6 months, as proven by @rugolini analysis, was -95%. This means that for every dollar we spend in emissions, we make 5 cents of revenue. I wasn’t around during the discussion about the controller, but I’m pretty sure that this wasn’t the expected result.

With that in mind, let me classify the dials impacted by the proposal into 4 groups:

  • Feeder pools & third party dials: these are the least profitable dials, and as far as I read the comments, we are all pretty aligned that it makes sense to disable them. In any case, it will be up to stakers.

  • Votium dial: I agree with everyone here regarding that (i) it’s more effective bribing than to give direct liquidity incentives & (ii) the mUSD-3crv Convex pool is essential to our ecosystem. The problem about this dial is that, given the price of MTA, it’s really hard to get to the minimum amount of USD in which bribing would be effective (Votium have some rules to discard dust pools - eg., bribes have to be at least 0,1% of the total amount of bribes for it to qualify to the round). This rule caused that the last two times we bribed were in rounds 13 and 20, that took place on March 8th and June 14th, respectively. While it’s true that TVL of the pool fell and that it might have had some effect on that, it’s not fair to say that it’s 100% the cause. mUSD was hit by the market turbulence. In any case, if we were to keep one dial, I’d be in favour to keep this one. Still, I personally believe that it’s better to disable it.

  • Save dials: I think that imUSD and imBTC should be treated differently. imUSD is the core product of the ecosystem, and if emissions were key to its success, I’d agree with you that disabling it would be dangerous. However, the APY of imUSD in the past 30 days was around 15% without counting emissions. That is already much higher than market rates. We don’t need to incentivise mUSD to keep liquidity because the product is already working by itself. Adding 1pp-2pp to the APY, in this case, seems to be more harmful than productive. imBTC, on the other hand, is a small product that didn’t find a lot of product market fit. It is showing up to a 12% APY in emissions, and the reason is likely a staker voting for this dial and farming with their BTC. A 12% APY on BTC under this market conditions is crazy. At this point I just think that we are giving away free money.

  • V2 dial: I agree with you that we need to have a bigger discussion around it. Maybe we can drop it from this RFC and discuss it in another one.

Finally, I want to reply to @trustindistrust claims. I agree that PoL is a success. I didn’t do a deep dive in DeFi 2.0 because it was a bit irrelevant for the sake of the post. I agree with you that “the real issue is that MTA doesn’t accrue direct value to holders”. I just believe that real value = revenues - emissions. We are working in increasing revenues (with v2), but if we don’t reduce emissions, it is extremely hard that the equation will ever be positive.

Thanks a lot @jkusne, I am largely in agreement with you on everything here.

There is some interesting debate to be had around which dials are better than others, but in the end of the day the returns on all of them are so negative that it doesn’t seem very relevant.

I believe that each MTA that is emitted to the ecosystem right now returns somewhere in the vicinity of $0.02 to the protocol (likely less as this assumes zero organic revenue, which is hopefully not the case). If the goal is to maximise the overall value of the protocol, directing MTA to the treasury objectively preserves more value (as MTA could be sold for more than 2c).

To quickly acknowledge a fair point that has been made by @dimsome outside of this forum, it may not be reasonable to consider ‘unissued’ MTA allocated to the EC in the same way that we would consider a Treasury asset on the balance sheet when doing these type of calculation. However, it still seems in the best interest of the protocol to maximise value created from these MTA. I can’t think of any other good reason to distribute MTA at this point.

To @dimsome 's point on keeping the imUSD dial - I don’t think there is an argument here from a purely financial point of view, as MTA spend is much greater than total revenue from the product. If the argument is that the protocol should continue paying a high cost to preserve TVL for some other reasons (brand image etc), or just to preserve some of the original intent of the EC, then maybe it’s worth thinking about. Personally, I think it would be very interesting to see what TVL is retained organically.

To @trustindistrust 's point about interfering with the intent of the EC, I agree that it’s not ideal to be undoing what was meant to be a market mechanism, however I think that drastic action is needed to address an inherent incentive problem in the current design which will continue to prevent the emissions controller from maximising value for the protocol:

  • Only a small percentage of MTA in circulation votes on dials
  • Many MTA stakers have external incentives to vote in ways which benefit them at the expense of non-voting MTA holders (as their value is ‘inflated’ away). mBTC is probably the clearest example of this, as described by Julian.

Long term, some very careful thought is needed on what type of dials will be beneficial to the project, while minimising the chance of exploitation.

As far as what dials should exist for now, I am in favour removing all dials except the Treasury and Staking. Although I also think that the staking dial is very bad due to the same incentive problem described above. Voters are incentivised to vote for dividends to themselves as they come at the expenses of non-voting ‘shareholders’ who don’t receive the dividend. But, assuming that investing back in to growth is a more valuable strategy than paying out dividends, the value of the protocol overall suffers. At the very least, we should leave a cap on this dial.

I am very supportive of defining more clearly what the Treasury dial (and any potential v2 dial) might be used for. There is already a significant amount of MTA that has been received by the Treasury dial that could be used in some interesting way (since it could be considered separately from the ‘unissued’ MTA).

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All great points!

@soulsby Yeah, thanks for bringing up my point. The value calculation of spend MTA is somewhat inaccurate for that exact point. Also, the MTA that is in the emissions controller has a value based on market price but the market cannot reasonably absorb the entirety of the emissions controller to have a meaningful value.

The Emissions Controller was created when the market was in a very different place and when V2 was not even a thought on most minds. I think the team, the product and the market change to such an extent that we should not be afraid to make some bold decisions.

I would like to propose a stepwise approach, though. As we already had the first batch of dials disabled, let’s continue this path and agree to disable the next batch of dials that most of us can get behind disabling. Disabling dials is fairly easy and doesn’t take up much time. Something more drastic would.

In parallel, we can start the discussion around the other dials and the Emissions Controller as a whole.

Let’s disable:

All feeder pools (GUSD, BUSD, RAI, FRAX)

  • BUSD has 6.2% of votes
  • RAI has 2.5%
  • FRAX has 14.2%

Note: Disabling Frax would lower SAVE APY on Polygon and hurt partners such as Gelt, Minki, 2PI

Third part dials:

  • Vesper Dial
  • Idle Dial

Dials to keep for now

  • Votium as it increases Save APY substantially, and bribes spend is returning us.
  • imUSD mainnet as this is our main product
  • imUSD on Polygon as this is mostly for our partners important
  • imBTC because this is more a decision to sunset the mBTC product and not just a dial discussion.

What I think we should not do, is disable ALL dials except for Staking and Treasury. If we decide to do this, we would be better of to completely rework tokennomics and disable emissions completely.

We would just give stakers the power to exert sell pressure.

I’m personally in favour of stripping the EC of old dials and rebooting it fresh for v2.

In detail, I’d love to see a dial for

  • v2 War chest
  • TreasuryDAO
  • MTA Staking
  • BPT Staking

I’d also love to see another RFC make its way to the forum after the first product of the v2 line has been deployed and decide on how to engage the war chest for the long-term to organically grow v2 adoption in the ecosystem.

I’d usually be all for an incremental approach, however I worry that if we don’t take decisive action and remove more dials here, the problem won’t actually be solved. The only guaranteed way to preserve value for the protocol is to significantly increase the amount that goes to Treasury (or V2) dials. If we remove feeder pool dials and the result is that more emissions just go to imUSD or imBTC, we haven’t actually gained anything.

Good point around partners who build on top of us - we should be considerate of the impact on them.

I don’t understand the rationale for continuing to incentive imBTC. Why can’t the product exist without the huge amount of incentives? To me, this dial seems like one of the worst.

I’m in support of @dimsome 's approach.

However, I still think that just massively reducing the weekly emissions from the controller as a whole would be more effective and wouldn’t undo the point of having the controller in the first place. It also doesn’t completely screw protocols that built on top of us. It’s much easier to justify an emissions reduction evenly across the board that affects everyone than “we killed your dial because it was killing us,” no matter how true that is.

I’m a little mystified at the support for keeping the Treasury dial in particular. It just looks like “accounting theater” to me. Keeping the treasury dial while disabling nearly all other choices not only has very poor optics but telegraphs governance weakness.

Basically, it looks like this:

I’d be in favor of just getting rid of the controller completely and negotiating directly with partners for MTA emissions, than keep the thing with “capped money for stakers and uncapped self-referential Treasury ‘income.’”

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That’s a fair point, and might sway me to look again at the other dials. Maybe we can curate a list of ecosystem partners and which dial they depend on to make the decision process easier?

I disagree here, as it’s not just accounting theater as you put it. The MTA Emissions for the ecosystem are carved out for the next 6 years via the EC, so putting them back into the Treasury is not just an accounting trick, but puts them out from the Emissions Controller cotnract back into the Treasury to use in whichever way the DAO wants to.

The same can be said for any other voter and the dial they vote on, with the difference that it’s literally their own elephant pipe, whereas putting them back to the Treasury arguably benefits every MTA holder equally, so not sure I can sign that meme ser :joy:

So what do you propose to do once the first v2 products roll out? Get governance to decide on a lump sum to incentivize, or otherwise make it interesting to use the product? I personally feel the EC is a fine idea, it just suffers a bit during this transition period, similar to a car manufacturer upgrading a part of their production line to be in tune with their new cars to be produced (maybe the example is not the best, but you get the idea).

Also, in regard to uncapped treasury “income”: it’s hardly that if you ask me.

If you see how MTA got used from the treasury over the entire last year, it was almost always exclusively to benefit the entire mStable ecosystem, so it’s very much a socialized claim on the MTA emissions for the benefit of everyone to use once the price recovers to more agreeable levels.

my 2 cts at least :sunglasses:

My point with the accounting theater is that currently, there is choice from the EC for a staker to direct MTA emissions.

Removing a ton of dials down to basically “give us money back (uncapped),” “give you money back (capped)” and “something something v2 (vague)” is not choice.

I have no issue with the Treasury dial currently, because it’s one choice among many. It’s not theater because many voters can chose many choices. It is obviously legitimate.

So to be clear, I’m not casting aspersions about quality of treasury management. I don’t doubt your claims about how the self-routed MTA was used. I am skeptical about the illusion of meaningful choice.

Hence my suggestion: Retain dials, dramatically reduce overall emissions.

I’m definitely repeating myself now so that’s a good cue to stop. I think I’ve said (more than) my piece.



Fair, I guess it goes against the ideology of letting stakers decide on the future of MTA in some way, so I see the issue more clearly now. If you see a nurse handling your baby in a way that ensures it is going to break a bone or two, wouldn’t you see it fit to intervene tho, based on facts disclosed to you?

Maybe that is a foundational and metaphorical question, though, rather than an actual question in regards to emissions, and definitely something I think we should evaluate for long-term as well, because maybe that is in the best interest of the majority?

I definitely think, even as a decentralization maxi, we might have to pull certain levers to ensure longevity vs self-interest. Wouldn’t you agree at least in principle there if you see we’re vastly approaching a concrete wall if we continue to let this happen unmonitored?

Very fair, and it goes back to my above statement a lot. Should there be free choice up to the point where this choice can run a project into the ground, or should there be some intervention that can happen at a critical point, or once a critical point in the event horizon has been reached? This should be the main discussion point to pave the way for the resolution here I feel strongly, if even we just find consensus and agreement there.

I agree strongly this would resolve the immediate issue, but I think it would retain the underlying issue that we’re seeing here. What is to prevent this from happening again? Initially, we developed the emissions controller to inceltivize Meta Governors to steward emissions in a way that would maximize profit for the mStable Protocol (and in longer-term, themselves), but I feel we’re seeing the results quite clearly now that self-interest is above all (and maybe rightfully so).

I think re-iteration and finding even the most basic consensus helps shape a system in a way that ultimately gets the job done the way it should, so I personally really enjoy these debates (most of the times :sweat_smile:)

@trustindistrust I agree with a lot of your points - a capped amount to stakers and an uncapped amount to Treasury results in fixed weights and renders the EC useless temporarily.

However, I am for this approach as a short-term work-around, assuming that the Emissions Controller itself and the amount of emissions are immutable. It could be seen as disingenuous, but it is proposed with the long-term interests of the protocol in mind and arguably respects the intended immutability of the EC deployment.

If it was possible (or seen as acceptable) to reduce the overall amount of emissions, I would be in favour of this (particularly if it meant we could extend emissions long beyond the 6-year horizon). However, that would only reduce the magnitude of the MTA losses from these dials and wouldn’t actually solve the underlying incentive problems.

gm everyone,

it looks like we’re having sort of a hard time finding consensus between the different opinions. What do you guys think of moving this to a temperature check either via poll here or directly on Snapshot to decide on which of the different options to debate in-depth?

As far as I see, there is really 3 camps right now:

  • Leave everything the way it is
  • Disable the EC completely until the first Metavault launches and then re-visit the topic
  • Disable all dials except Treasury, V2 war chest & imUSD on both Polygon & Mainnet

Does that sound like a good way forward, or did I miss something? Looking forward to moving this on, so we can be prepared in time!

I think options would need to be expanded a little to capture everything discussed here, maybe something like:

  • Leave every as it is
  • Pause EC completely for now and revisit with the first Metavault
  • Reduce the overall emissions amount but leave the current dials active
  • Disable dials except staking, treasury (and maybe v2 incentivisation pool)
  • Disable only feeder pool dials

Worth noting that there could be a pretty significant difference between a poll here and a snapshot vote give the token weighting.

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