✅ [RFC] mStableDAO Restructure Proposal

Thanks to @mZeroNine and many others for their work on this RFC.


This RFC would like to gather feedback regarding a proposal to restructure the mStableDAO in order to improve flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness of the DAO, creating a scalable model that will enable mStable to focus on becoming a leader in ERC-4626 vaults.

The key actions prosed include:

  • Introduce a new set of expectations and responsibilities for ProtocolDAO and TreasuryDAO signers.
  • Suggest a fair compensation structure for all signers and a simple system for compensating individual signers for additional responsibilities.
  • Create a standardized election process for signers of the ProtocolDAO and TreasuryDAO and pave the way for the first round of signer elections to be held immediately following resolution of this proposal.
  • Merge the Asset Management subDAO with the TreasuryDAO and absorb primary funding functions of the Funding subDAO back into the TreasuryDAO.
  • Suggest creation of a new “Product subDAO” and consolidation of the GrantsDAO and Community subDAO into an “Ecosystem subDAO”. Futher details and initial funding requests for these entities would be presented in separate RFCs following the successful resolution of this proposal.


Proposed DAO/subDAO Structure

Note that the names of the ProtocolDAO, TreasuryDAO, Product subDAO and Ecosystem subDAO are subject to change and discussion is welcome on appropriate names for these entities, considering their proposed functions.

Purpose and Responsibilities of Entities


The mStableDAO is made up of all MTA Governors and contributors, and represents a collective organization of entities rather than a specific multi-sig.

The role of the mStableDAO is to govern, operate, and fund the growth and development of the mStable protocol and ecosystem. High-level functions of the mStableDAO include:

  • Hold governance votes to gain consensus on key decisions around protocol changes, treasury utilization, and signer structure.
  • Ensure that all approved governance votes are executed to implement changes to the protocol or to disburse Treasury funds accordingly.
  • Facilitate discretionary decision-making through elected signer groups within powers granted by MTA governors.
  • Perform critical tasks required to sustain the ongoing operation of the protocol, such that the protocol can operate indefinitely, independent from the ongoing contribution of subDAOs.
  • Facilitate multiple methods of compensating contributors, through funding of subDAOs, direct compensation of contributors, and supporting the use of decentralized tools such as Dework and Parcel.


It is suggested that this should be a 4/6 or 4/7 multisig with an elected signer group.


The function of the Protocol DAO is to execute the will of MTA Governors around changes to the mStable Protocol and ensure the smooth long-term operation of the protocol.


  • Execute protocol changes approved by governance by creating and executing necessary transactions in a timely manner. Note that this function could be brought on-chain in the future, reducing the scope and power of the ProtocolDAO.
  • Make decisions in line with discretionary powers granted through governance, such whitelisting smart contract addresses for MTA staking. A complete record of discretionary powers should be created as part of this restructure.
  • Handle operational tasks directly related to the ongoing function of the mStable protocol, including making requests to the TreasuryDAO to fund protocol gas costs.


It is suggested that this should be a 4/6 or 4/7 multisig with an elected signer group.


The function of the TreasuryDAO is to execute the will of MTA Governors around custody, management, and disbursement of the assets of mStableDAO.


  • Disburse funds to subDAOs or other entities in line with governance decisions by creating and executing necessary transactions in a timely manner. Note that this function could be brought on-chain in the future, reducing the scope and power of the TreasuryDAO.
  • Make discretionary decisions in allocating capital assets in line with discretionary powers granted through governance, including allocating treasury assets in whitelisted protocols up to a defined value to build a productive treasury, and approving funding for pre-approved DAO expenses. A complete record of discretionary powers should be created as part of this restructure.
  • Handle operational tasks directly related to the ongoing function of the mStable protocol, including payment of DAO signers and Catherders, funding of protocol gas costs, and payment of tools and subscriptions.

Consolidating the Asset Management subDAO back into the TreasuryDAO

As part of creating the new proposed structure, the role of the current Asset Management subDAO would be absorbed back into the TreasuryDAO. With active and engaged signers, we believe that treasury management and funding transactions can be executed in a timely manner with this larger signer structure, while significantly improving the security of treasury assets.

So as to minimize the workload caused by this transition, it is proposed that once the new TreasuryDAO signers are elected, the current AM subDAO signers are replaced with the new TreasuryDAO signer group. This would allow the AM subDAO to remain as simply a separate account in the short term, to give time to migrate assets without compromising on security.

Signer Election and Compensation

It is proposed that an open nomination process be held in the mStable Forum or Discord, allowing current contributors and community members to nominate themselves as signers for the ProtocolDAO or TreasuryDAO. There would then be a governance vote to decide the signers for each DAO. It is suggested that signer elections take place every 6 months.

All DAO signers would be expected to be regularly available to verify and confirm transactions, as well as being available for scheduled meetings. There would also be expectations around active participation in governance discussions in the mStable forum and Discord. Specific requirements and exact compensation will need to be laid out as part of the election process. It is suggested that each signer is paid a monthly stipend in MTA, perhaps targeting US$1000 per month with quarterly reviews to adjust the MTA amount based on MTA price. Signers who take on extra operational responsibilities should be compensated additionally. Discussion of details is welcomed here.

In addition to DAO signers, it is proposed that a Cat Herder or Governance Coordinator is compensated directly by the mStableDAO to facilitate governance processes.


Proposed subDAO Scope

Historically, subDAOs have been considered to be under management by the mStableDAO. This RFC suggests that subDAOs be granted full discretion around spending and decision making as their own work committees, and be only indirectly accountable to MTA holders through their funding agreements with the mStableDAO.

The proposed DAO structure allows for the creation and funding of future subDAOs by governance proposal. Any subDAO should have the freedom to propose its own signer structure, decision-making processes, and goals.

Each subDAO funding proposal should include clear deliverables and funding should be disbursed by the TreasuryDAO either at regular intervals or even through an ongoing stream if practical. This provides an opportunity for evaluation of the performance and the ability for MTA governors to halt funding if expectations are not being met.

This RFC suggests two subDAOs, mirroring mStable’s key operating functions: Product & Ecosystem. Further proposals will be required to lay out detailed funding requests for these subDAOs.

Product subDAO

It is proposed that the current Funding subDAO multisig wallet be repurposed to create a Product subDAO. The signer group would be changed to create a 2/3 multisig consisting of full-time contributors. Specific details would be outlined in an initial funding request following the successful resolution of this proposal.


The product subDAO is responsible for designing, proposing and delivering new products or improvements to the current mStable products.


  • Recruit and manage contributors
  • Create governance proposals for product changes or deployment of new products
  • Manage public documentation

Ecosystem subDAO

It is proposed that the former community subDAO and GrantsDAO be combined to create an Ecosystem subDAO. The proposed signer structure would be outlined in the initial funding request for this new entity.


The purpose of the Ecosystem subDAO would be to grow and engage the community of people and projects using and building on top of mStable.


  • Create community-driven content
  • Fund initiatives in the ecosystem through grants
  • Support the Metanaut program and Coordinape
  • Manage community calls and events and post recordings.
  • Moderate discord and handle support requests
  • Disburse MTA to active contributors for Discord tipping


mStable is transitioning toward a new vision of becoming a leader in 4626 vaults and an efficient DAO structure is critical in making this vision a reality.

Since its inception, the mStableDAO has gone through several iterations in an attempt to improve its efficiency. Examples include improvements to the ProtocolDAO structure, the creation of the Asset Management subDAO and creation of the Funding subDAO.

Fundamentally, the ProtocolDAO and TreasuryDAO have proven to serve their purpose in executing the will of the Meta Governors. However, we have learned that slow execution in multisigs has not always been resolved by reducing the size of the signer group and that in fact, 2/3 multisigs may be more susceptible to delays than larger structures such as 4/7 multisigs. This is evidenced by the efficiency of the current ProtocolDAO, and the delays that have been experienced in smaller signer structures within the Asset Management and Funding subDAOs. Instead, delays tend to be caused by a lack of clarity in the responsibilities of signers and a lack of availability and engagement, as well as time zone differences in some cases.

Inefficiencies that have been identified in the current DAO structure include:

  • The complexity of the current DAO structure and a lack of clarity around the responsibilities and purpose of each entity
  • A number of disengaged signers on the TreasuryDAO, leading to long delays in transaction execution
  • Lack of thorough review and verification of transactions due to low involvement in the governance or decision-making process
  • Compromised security in the Asset Management subDAO, which now custodies around $3.5m in assets, without significant gains in efficiency
  • Growth of off-chain entity operations and associated costs, leading to more centralization and complexity
  • A disconnect between the way the core team works together and the structure of the DAO
  • A lack of clear purpose and deliverables for entities funded by the mStableDAO

This proposal aims to address the inefficiencies outlined above through simplification of DAO structure and clarification of the purpose, responsibilities, and decision-making processes within each entity.

Aside from aligning with a new vision and focus for mStable, the timing of this review also coincides with a number of key dates that would have already required individual governance processes.

  • Community signer re-elections (these were due to occur in late May)
  • The end of the 1-year review period for the GrantsDAO (end of June)
  • The end of the previous round of project funding approved by governance (end of June)


  • Enabling mStable to move fast and work effectively to build a significant new product and become a leader in vaults
  • Establish a responsive and informed signer group that is actively engaged in Meta Governance and aligned with mStable’s new product direction
  • Facilitate quick execution of governance decisions and benefit from the efficiency of more agile decision-making processes at the subDAO level.
  • Create a clear separation of responsibilities within the DAO structure and increase decentralization.
  • Create a system that can be further decentralized in the future and scaled with the addition of subDAOs as required
  • Improve pathways for individuals to contribute to the mStableDAO and engage more community members in active roles.


  • The additional workload in implementing these changes and migrating the Asset Management subDAO back into the TreasuryDAO
  • Compensation models for some contributors could be more complex if they contribute to multiple entities.

Next Steps

It is suggested that the community comment on this RFC prior to the 20th of June to help inform the creation of a formal draft proposal on Github to be used for review.

Meta Governors are encouraged to provide as much feedback as possible on this proposal.


@soulsby @mZeroNine this is awesome.

I contributed to the thinking on this post and am really pleased with how this proposal turned out. I think it is critical that we make the DAOs more efficient. Without doing so, we will not be able to be 4626 leaders as our organisation will be too beauocratic and slow. An offshoot of this proposal is that this makes mStable more decentralised. There is a greater connectivity between Meta Governors and their signers on the Treasury DAO and the Protocol DAO. Having an explicit Product subDAO also means that we are putting onchain the criticial work that full time contributors are doing. With the rise of products like Utopia Labs, this means mStable can evolve to managing every aspect of its operation through its DAO structure.

A few things:

  • will there be a separate RFC on the election process? I think this is important to get right.
  • what do you mean here?
    “So as to minimize the workload caused by this transition, it is proposed that once the new TreasuryDAO signers are elected, the current AM subDAO signers are replaced with the new TreasuryDAO signer group. This would allow the AM subDAO to remain as simply a separate account in the short term, to give time to migrate assets without compromising on security.”
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Thanks James. I hoped that we could define the election process for signers as part of this proposal, to avoid the need to introduce another 3 week delay before the election process is started. But if the consensus is that this needs to be it’s own topic then that is fine too. Given that the ProtocolDAO and TreasuryDAO entities exist regardless of how this proposal resolves, perhaps the change in the election process could be proposed in parallel with this RFC, rather than being dependant on it?

Regarding you second question - this is an implementation detail but I am just thinking about the practicalities of moving assets from the Asset Management subDAO. I’m not sure if all assets can easily be transferred back to the TreasuryDAO in the short term or if some are locked up (maybe @mZeroNine can confirm). If required, I think the old AM subDAO multisig could just be controlled by the TreasuryDAO signers for a period of time until all assets are migrated.


Thanks for clarifying Cam. Let’s do the election stuff here then. Can you write a small post in the comments section describing how you see it happening?
I understand what you meant about the AM subDAO. Fully support that as an interim step.

Big post!

Interested in:

  • What are the additional responsibilities signers can take on? Do we have examples of this?
  • Can these be integrated with the job board that @Fungus and I have been working on?
  • Is the cross-DAO signer restriction still in place?
  • This wasn’t explicit but (for example) is the ProtocolDAO still a set number of Core Devs plus community people, or are all ‘seats’ actually open?

Yes please. I would like to help with this, the docs need updating and some mild re-org.

Tangentially related, I still have custody of the mstablecommunity.eth ENS. I’m happy to turn that over to the Ecosystem DAO as soon as it is formed.

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I don’t have a terrible amount to add, but wanted to chime in that I fully support Cam’s initiative here.


Thanks trust. Good questions.

Regarding additional responsibilities, one of the main tasks that stands out is actually creating transactions in the multisig based on governance proposals or decisions made within the signer group. Other responsibilities could include researching opportunities for capital deployment, handling relationships with subDAOs or other parties, record-keeping, helping run meetings, etc. I’m sure there are other examples. I know @mZeroNine has been communicating with @Fungus regarding how Dework could be used here.

I’m not sure about the cross-DAO signer restriction. I think ideally they would be separate groups but maybe it doesn’t need to be a hard rule. I also don’t think we need to be explicit about different categories of signers, as long as the signers collectively have the right knowledge and experience to handle the required tasks. What do you think?

Thanks @james.simpson. This is what I had in mind:

1/ Details of signer responsibilities, expectations and compensation should be agreed on as part of this proposal (perhaps @mZeroNine or others can share some thoughts on details here)
2/ Signer elections for the Protocol and TreasuryDAO to happen every 6 months, with the ability for signers to be re-elected across multiple terms.
3/ Election process kicked off with a forum post inviting nominations from individuals, where anyone can make their case for why they are the right person for one of the roles
4/ A snapshot vote where MTA Governors can select their preferred candidates (may someone with more knowledge of Snapshot can speak to the best way to handle this)

We also need to think about how additional responsibilities within the signer group should be decided, as additional compensation should also be approved by Governance. Does anyone have good ideas here?

What other details are important to gain agreement on this process?

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Interesting proposal! A few points and questions:

  • Would we have an election for ALL signers, or only for the community signers?
  • Proposing to rename the ProductDAO to BuilderDAO
  • ProtocolDAO and ProductDAO seem to have quite the overlapping functions. ProtocolDAO has a lot of core contributors that have the most knowledge about the current products, while the ProductDAO is essentially the same group?
  • The SubDAOs will not be elected? What is the process of determining who is part of these SubDAOs.
  • Propose to remove the word grants from the Ecosystem DAO, Grants imply a no-strings attached upfront disbursement of funds. We should be more strategic with funding projects as we learned in the GrantsDAO.

These are so far the questions that came up for me.


This is a good summary @soulsby

I would try and copy successful examples from other, bigger projects like Synthetix. Some information can be found here: Voting for the next epoch’s Synthetix Councils!

That said, I think we can work the details out later. The main purpose of this RFC is to get alignment on the high level concept articulated here, in order to make the DAOs more effective and efficient.

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  • proposal is for all signers to be elected
  • really like BuilderDAO!
  • The productDAO as the full time builders, whereas the protocolDAO are the technical guardians. The productDAO is about innovation and pushing mStable forward. Would be interested to look into how they overlap.
  • @soulsby can you respond to this one
  • Likewise here.

Thanks @dimsome !

Thanks a lot for this detailed and thorough proposal @soulsby @mZeroNine

General feedback

  • I’m really aligned with what’s written here. It makes a lot of sense to streamline the operations of the project by improving the DAO/SubDAO structure and empowering existing/new signers in their mandates.

  • Proposing a constant allocation in MTA to contributors vs. an off-the-shelf model is the easiest one to implement, bootstrap and operate. Also, this $1000 amount is very coherent with the project size (TVL + Size of Treasury) if you use Synthetix as a proxy.

  • Riffing on @trustindistrust point, a good way to justify this “universal income” beyond general signing requirements, could be very specific tasks identified by the community and presented on dashboards like Dework. I’m not sure it would work for every DAO/subDAO but it’s definitely a nice to consider in the medium run

  • Having a Product SubDAO (Builder DAO) and Ecosystem SubDAO would make the structure very lean. SubDAOs should be self-sufficient (apart from public goods). SubDAOs are small independent units funded by the Treasury DAO every epoch and should manage their spending

  • About the process: using bespoke channels in Discord (i.e BuilderDAO application, Treasury DAO applications, etc) to have people introduce their candidacy and have active discussions could be a good thing to pair with a definitive forum post. Would love to hear @Fungus opinion on this.

Nota Bene
Imo, the purpose of this RFC is to get general feedback on the structure. The specifics (Exact election process and details, SubDAOs precise mandate and signers, etc) will be tackled in a series of TDPs covering precise sections

I’m really looking forward to seeing this proposal turned into a new chapter for mStable governance :rocket:

Thanks everyone for your great feedback and input on this RFC!

A few things that were previously hinted at, we would like to move forward with the first TDP for this soon, and this will require a basic consensus to be formed. Please let us know if you do NOT agree with this process of splitting and overall restructuring, as otherwise we will assume that a basic consensus has been found, and the first portion of this RFC will be turned into a TDP next week!

I’m not sure if all assets can easily be transferred back to the TreasuryDAO in the short term or if some are locked up (maybe @mZeroNine can confirm)

This will be an ongoing process if successful. Some assets are easily moved, as they are an ERC-20, other assets have lockup times and will be moved after the lock expires (CVX is a great example)

Regarding Elections

We found consensus yesterday in an internal call to create separate posts for the elections. Regarding the elections themselves, and to answer the question raised by @dimsome, all seats will be up for elections, and there will be no more differentiation between “core team” and “core community” “independent signers” or “ecosystem participants”.

We have a single role “core contributor” (final name tbd) which will take up each and every seat. We will also hold re-elections on a half-yearly basis during which every seat will be up again for being taken. Of course, existing core contributors can be re-elected into the same seats.

Each election thread will have exacts, but @soulsby already showed a few basics below, so it’s a good starting point to get the discussion going here.

Regarding Responsibilities

As Cam already hinted at, this can be creating txs, but a normal signer seat will NOT be performing this, as the responsibility and coordination needs to be adhered to by the Cat Herder and Ops Signer (final title tbc, but it’s an add-on role to the normal signer role and not everyone will be doing this) .

That’s only an example of an additional task that will be compensated on top of the core responsibilities. A much clearer picture will be painted in the actual signer election posts, which will highlight this in great detail. I’ll hopefully be able to post a draft of this together with @soulsby in the coming 2 weeks to present here in this RFC for input and feedback by you all! Extra input in the meantime is of course deeply appreciated!

DeWork will play a role in this, but it’s important to note that every core contributor will have a set of jobs as a baseline, and then additional workloads are handled via ad-hoc on DeWork (DeWork will be implemented gradually into the entire workflow, but we want to keep it agile, so initial rollouts can happen swiftly without the need to ratify via DeWork).

Regarding Cross-signers

As Cam said already, in a perfect world there will be no cross-DAO signers, but it will depend on the actual elections to see how many people are interested. It might be a process that will take place over multiple elections, but I think we all agree in a perfect world there would be individual signers in each of the 2 DAOs to maximize decentralization.

Regarding @dimsome’s queries

A lot was answered already, but I want to highlight that it’s important to decentralize the working entity from the ProtocolDAO and that’s the reason we want to create a 2nd entity. While it is probably going to be overlapping in the beginning, the goal is to have a lot more diversity in the ProtocolDAO and move away from having the Product subDAO (BuilderDAO) own a majority vote in the ProtocolDAO for decentralization purposes. The rest is exactly as @james.simpson has said already.

SubDAOS are independent working committees and can elect participants themselves, without the need for Meta Governors to ratify. What will be ratified via governance is the funding of these subDAO entities. This will drastically improve agility and decentralization of the DAO overall, and give subDAOs the opportunity and possibility to actually be autonomous - just what a DAO should be.

Agreed regarding the GrantsDAO point, and this will be tackled in detail in a resulting TDP from this (the idea is that we’ll create three or 4 TDPs from this RFC, to be able to get explicit voting results from each point, and run several discussions in parallel).

Regarding Next Steps

As hinted at previously, it is important we move forward. While I know there’s still a LOT of open questions, I’d suggest we are able to move the first TDP forward early next week on the overall restructuring of the DAO.

This TDP will ONLY tackle the overall restructuring, so we can continue to discuss subDAOS, Elections, Compensations and other things here as we’re moving that part forward.

So if everyone is ok on a fundamental level with the restructuring in general, and there are no objections, I’ll begin crafting TDP 44.1 for next Tuesday or Wednesday the latest.

Exact details on this and further discussion about the restructuring of the mStableDAO should then only happy in TDP 44.1, given we are all ok to move forward.

Please continue to discuss all the other points not relating to the fundamental restructure here, and we’ll probably tackle TDP 44.2 next, which is concerning the elections. Election Process, duration, re-elections, and so forth…

Thanks again everyone for your great input, and for tackling this behemoth of a RFC together! :sunglasses: :facepunch:


Thanks @mZeroNine , very supportive of creating multiple TDPs from this proposal to allow parallel discussion of the separate important topics.


Loooks goood to me. :grinning:

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gm everyone!

TDP 44: mStableDAO Restructure is now live in the forum, and I invite each one of you to have a read through this proposal and funnel and channel all related questions there from now on.

In this RFC, we should now be focusing on the upcoming crafting of TDP 45 concerning the election process for the restructuring, I’ll quickly summarize the findings of this thread, so we can focus this week on discussing this in greater detail as to be able to find consensus and be able to craft a successful TDP for next week:

Summary of the Election Process so far

  • Create a standardized election process for signers of the ProtocolDAO and TreasuryDAO and pave the way for the first round of signer elections to be held immediately following resolution of this proposal.

  • Both the ProtocolDAO and the TreasuryDAO are to operate under a 4/6 signer structure and each signer be elected under a universal contributor title with the same compensation

  • It is proposed that an open nomination process be held in the mStable Forum or Discord, allowing current contributors and community members to nominate themselves as signers for the ProtocolDAO or TreasuryDAO. There would then be a governance vote to decide the signers for each DAO.

  • It is suggested that signer elections take place every 6 months.

  • The election process will commence upon resolution of TDP 45 and threads be posted in the mStable Forum and Discord to kick the process off

  • We would discuss here the compensation, expectation, and responsibilities of a universal core contributor. Any additional tasks to this are not to be discussed here now, but part of the compensation TDP and the subsequent DeWork attachment

  • Cross-DAO signers are not an encouraged theme, but tolerated for now

  • A universal basic signer compensation of $1000 mUSD worth in MTA is proposed, with the MTA price re-calculated on a quarterly basis to ensure a fair compensation over time

  • It is suggested to let the elections run for 2 weeks before we move them to Snapshot, and have the Snapshot take place for 5 days as usual.

I think this is everything from above. If anyone sees something that I’ve missed, please let me know, and I’ll add it to this post!

We now should focus on specific details and points that make up the heart and soul of TDP 45 and everyone is invited to contribute to this in the coming days to come and find consensus on how the multisig signers are to be elected and compensated in greater detail.

With all of the above in mind, I’ll spend a day later in the week to craft something that could resemble a preliminary TDP which we can all add things to and from given we find consensus quickly, but I would hope to get more feedback on the overall process and ideation here before we do that, so we don’t just simply sign off on some procured work from someone else.

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First off, there has been some extremely thorough and thoughtful discourse here. I really appreciate everyone’s hard work and involvement on such an important endeavor.

Going along with previous discussions outside the forum, I’ll reiterate here that I fully support this DAO restructure and believe it will deliver the intended value we seek.

Responding to @trustindistrust: @mZeroNine hit on some great points about Dework’s role. There is still plenty to discuss here, but my current thoughts on Dework is that each subDAO in particular will effectively manage their own portions of the bounty board themselves, all under the same mStable application page. I have been in regular contact with the Dework team to ensure this type of organization is both possible and efficient through their platform and fortunately it is. I can serve as the point of contact for any Dework concerns as we get everyone up to speed on how best to utilize it.

As @mZeroNine stated, it’ll be imperative to define as objectively as possible the roles of core contributors. Once done, the subDAO’s can identify extra ad hoc work that ought to be outsourced, determine a fair bounty price with their respective funding constraints, and then post, assign tasks, review submitted tasks, and initiate bounty payments.

@TClochard I think that’s a great idea. We can create some channels for the Builder subDAO, Ecosystem subDAO etc., for community members to ask questions and converse about the new structure, announce any candidacies, and eventually discuss ongoing and upcoming tasks.

Optimistic about this initiative!

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Thanks a lot for your summary @mZeroNine.

I’ll add some additional thoughts around the election process prior to TDP 45:

I understand that if TDP 45 resolves successfully we should be in a position to start the signer election process immediately. Therefore, basic signer responsibilities and compensation should be agreed upon in this TDP.

Based on previous discussions with some of the core team, I think minimum expectations of all signers should include:

1.) Be available to confirm multi-sig transactions within a 24 hour time window except in rare circumstances, which should be communicated to the DAO.

2.) Spend at least 10 hours per month on the official mStable governance forums to participate in Meta Governance discussions

3.) Spend at least 10 hours per month in the official mStable Discord and meaningfully contribute to the ecosystem, whether that be participating in governance-related discussions or just engaging with the community

4.) Be available and willing to participate actively in monthly TreasuryDAO & Governance Signer Calls (EU or similar time zone preferred. Perhaps we should even set regular times in advance so that candidates can ensure that they will be available?)

5.) Have a solid understanding of good OpSec practices, perhaps including a requirement to use a hardware wallet as a signer address?

6.) Additionally, TreasuryDAO signers should have a sound understanding of DeFi, keep themselves updated on developments and emerging technologies, and be able to read and understand queued multi-sig transactions and their expected behaviour. ProtocolDAO signers should have a sound understanding of Solidity, smart contract interactions, and other relevant skills.

We should also consider if there are any specific requirements around to meet around reputation. Eg. how should risks around anon signers and potential collusion be minimised?

Do others think that these requirements seem fair considering ~$1000 worth of MTA monthly as compensation? Alternatively, the compensation could be reduced slightly with a reduced expectation on time spent in the forum/Discord. This could be worth exploring to reduce the overall cost to the project, especially given current market conditions.

I think the points outlined above are fine. I’m concerned with how to track “hours of engagement” (let’s call it). If we agree it’s a soft requirement, it will likely be abused/ignored. If we agree it’s a hard requirement, there has to be a mechanism to track it. I’m not aware of any way to do this, in Discord or here on the forum.

On top of that, in order to make it a requirement, there has to be something that happens if someone fails to meet it.

With that in mind, I think that the engagement stuff can only be a soft requirement. Booting a signer (who otherwise signs everything well inside the 24hr window and doesn’t need constant nannying) for not talking much on Discord seems unnecessarily disruptive.

Otherwise, I think possessing a hardware signer should be a firm requirement. This is easy for me to say because I have one, but I feel pretty strongly on this point. For anyone asked to sign cross-DAO, I think two devices should be mandatory.

Good points @trustindistrust. I have mixed feelings about bundling signer responsibilities with required engagement on forums in general, but it does seem like a positive way to encourage participation and input from a group of well respected community members. Agree that it would be more of a soft requirement, just to give people an idea of expectations. In saying that, Karma ratings could be a good way to gauge overall participation in a quantitative way, and this could be useful when considering re-election of signers or even ejection of underperforming signers.