🧊 [RFC] Votium disbursement process


This RFC seeks to gather feedback on a proposed mechanism to decide and codify the disbursement of MTA to Votium from the forwarder contract.

It is proposed to evaluate 2 parameters: the relative value of the bribe compared to the round as well as the total value of the MTA to be disbursed, approximately 12-24 hours before the end of each round.


As the price of MTA drops, the value of the bribe that is devoted each week also sinks lows at which the disbursement towards Votium becomes uneconomical. To receive any votes within a Votium round (every two weeks) a minimum of 0.1% of votes must be received, which is roughly equivalent to the relative value of all bribes.


This implementation would allow for a rule-based decision process that would first be in alignment with decentralized governance and secondly reduce overhead and granular decisions that need to be taken by the core contributors.

Originally, it was intended to disburse the accumulated MTA every 2 weeks, matching the schedule of Votium. However, the amounts that were received by the dial are not always sufficient to allow for the inclusion of the minimum amount of votes on the platform and would otherwise be lost. This proposal tries to establish a process to allow for autonomous decision-making that is backed by MTA governors.


The proposed rule to disperse the MTA is the following:

  • If the value of the MTA is above 0.2% of all other bribes AND
  • above a value of $25k the VotiumBribeForwarder shall be triggered.
  • This is to be reviewed 12-24h before the end of each round. (Every second Tuesday 00:00 UTC)


  • Predictable and reliable guidelines
  • Less ad-hoc decisions, less prone to error
  • In coherence with Meta governors


  • Less flexible
  • Might require additional fine-tuning to get this process just right

Next Steps

It is suggested that the community comment on this RFC in the coming days, and bearing no significant opposition or change in ideation, we would move ahead with this RFC in the coming week and create a formal draft proposal on Github to be used for review.
Meta Governors are encouraged to provide as much feedback as possible until then, so we can create the best possible outcome for mStable and its users.


I think that’s a great idea, and definitely in line with making our life easier, all the while decentralizing operations more!

Big thumbs up from me, and great work guys!


I’m fine with this, but I’m curious about one point. Why the wait until (nearly) the end of the round in order to fire off the round or not? Maybe the reason is obvious but nothing is really coming to mind.

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To see everyone else’s deposit and evaluate whether our queued amount hit the criteria. The later we deposit, the closer it is to the real amount and the more certainty we have when applying the framework.